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1. INTRODUCTION
Increased use of the limited partnership' form of business organization
over the past 20 years has proven the 1916 Uniform Limited Partnership
Act2 (1916 ULPA) inadequate for modern business conditions. In 1976,
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Commissioners) ap-
proved a Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976 ULPA) 3 de-
signed to modernize the old Act.
The 1976 ULPA is a definite improvement over the 1916 ULPA.4 The
new Act, however, makes only slight changes in one of the important and
problematic parts of the old Act-the role of limited partners. As it is
likely that a number of legislatures will consider adoption of the 1976
1. Limited partnerships are partnerships offering limited partner-investors the opportunity to
limit their liability to the amount of their investment. General partners are generally liable and have
exclusive management power. In the last 20 years, the tax advantages available to limited partner-
ships (see note 36 infra) have led to the growth of large limited partnerships operating in such areas as
real estate, farming, mineral development and entertainment. See generall' A. BROMBERG, CRANE
AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 143-51 (1968); Aslanides, Cardinali. Haynsworth, Lane & Niesar.
Limited Partnerships-What's Next and What's Left?, 34 Bus. LAW. 257 (1978).
2. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT, reprinted in 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 559 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1916 ULPA]. The 1916 ULPA has been adopted in forty-nine jurisdictions.
The limited partnership is a statutory form of business organization. Prior to adoption of the 1916
ULPA, most states had provided for limited partnerships. The need for a uniform law arose primarily
from the rigid interpretations of state limited partnership acts by most courts. See notes 8-16 and
accompanying text infra.
3. REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AT, reprinted in 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 127 (Supp.
1979) [hereinafter cited as 1976 ULPA].
4. Most commentators agree that the 1976 ULPA is a substantial improvement over the 1916
ULPA. Some of the most notable changes are the provision for foreign limited partnerships (art. 9).
the provision for centralized filing of partnership certificates (§ 206), and the provision for partner
derivative suits (art. 10). The 1976 ULPA also modernizes and clarifies provisions of the 1916
ULPA.
The 1976 ULPA is discussed favorably in the following comments: Aslanides, et. al., supra note I
(the 1976 ULPA will resolve many of the problems of forming and operating limited partnerships):
Shapiro, The Need for Limited Partnership Reform: A Revised Uniform Act. 37 MD. L. REV. 544
(1978) (comparing the 1976 ULPA with the Maryland version of the 1916 ULPA. Shapiro finds the
new Act thoughtful and progressive; it modernizes and clarifies while maintaining the basic character
of the limited partnership); Symposium, Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 479 (1978) (the
1976 ULPA modernizes and clarifies the 1916 ULPA). See also Hecker, Limited Partners' Deriva-
tive Suits Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 33 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1980) (provi-
sion for partner derivative suits is important and positive). But see Kessler, The Nest' Uniform Limited
Partnership Act: A Critique, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 159 (1979) (The 1976 ULPA is not that much
better than the 1916 ULPA; it lacks clarity, many of the policy changes are dubious, certificate re-
quirements remain burdensome, central filing will be too expensive for the state, and the provisions
for partner derivative suits fail to provide adequate procedural safeguards. To remedy these flaws
would render the 1976 ULPA nonuniform). See also Hecker, The Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act: Provisions Affecting the Relationship of the Firm and its Members to Third Parties, 27
KAN. L. REV. 1 (1978) (the 1976 ULPA, although it succeeds in streamlining certificate requirements
and clarifying control, lacks overall clarity; the changes made by the 1976 ULPA are dubious as they
affect third parties).
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ULPA in the near future, 5 this comment is written to provide guidance in
the area of the limited partner's role. After examining the role of the lim-
ited partner as it has evolved within the structure of the 1916 ULPA, this
comment discusses changes made by the 1976 ULPA and recommends
three changes in the new Act.
First, the control limitation should be narrowed to apply only to the
limited partner who exercises control substantially the same as a general
partner. Second, general partners should be required to regularly disclose
certain partnership information. Third, the act should require limited part-
ner approval of extraordinary transactions and of all transactions involv-
ing a general partner conflict of interest. With these changes, the act will
more fully reflect modem ideas about investor protection and the reality
of the substantial risks inherent in many limited partnership activities.
II. THE 1916 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
The limited partner's role under the 1916 ULPA is restricted both by
the extensive powers granted the general partners and by specific limita-
tions on activities of the limited partners. The 1916 ULPA gives general
partners control over virtually all aspects of partnership operations. 6 The
Act provides only minimal restraints on general partner decisions, even in
transactions that alter the partnership's activities or basic structure. 7 It
contains no direct restraints on general partner self-dealing. At the same
time, the 1916 ULPA threatens the limited partner who exercises "con-
trol" of the partnership with general liability for partnership obligations.
5. The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that limited partnerships formed under the 1976
ULPA will, like those formed under the 1916 ULPA, normally qualify for partnership tax treatment.
Proposed Amendment to Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as circulated to interested parties, but not yet
published in Federal Register). See note 36 infra. It is likely that the 1976 ULPA will now receive
rapid acceptance in state legislatures. As of this writing Arkansas, Connecticut, Minnesota and Wy-
oming have adopted the 1976 ULPA. Telephone Interview with National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (Oct. 27, 1980).
6. Section 9 of the 1916 ULPA provides that: "A general partner shall have all the
rights . . . and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners .... ." Section
18(e) of the UNwoFRM PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 213 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
UPA] states: "All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership busi-
ness."
One commentator states: "Despite the fact that ordinarily both the limited partner and the share-
holder enjoy limited liability, there is an enormous difference in the quantum of power permissible to
each. In the limited partnership virtually all power is vested in the general partners." Taubman,
Limited Partnerships, 3 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 15, 24 (1962).
7. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text infra.
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A. Historical Context
Prior to 1916, most states had limited partnership acts. Under these
acts, the limited liability of limited partners was treated as a privilege and
conditioned on exact compliance with statutory requirements. 8 State stat-
utes often included complex filing requirements 9 and bars to limited part-
ner participation in the conduct of the business.10 A defective limited
partnership was treated as a general partnership. " As a result, limited
partnerships were not widely used; investors who sought limited liability
preferred the corporate form. 12
In drafting the 1916 ULPA, the Commissioners sought to change
this. 13 Their primary concern was to ensure that limited partners could,
under the new Act, have "the same sense of security from any possibility
of unlimited liability as the subscribers to the shares of a corporation." ' 4
The 1916 ULPA was drafted to suit the typical limited partnership of
the time, one that was relatively small and consensual.15 Such partner-
ships offered built-in protections. The partners normally negotiated the
partnership agreement. The limited partners often knew the general part-
ners and were able to evaluate their character and experience. Limited
partners often had direct contact with the partnership business and were
aware of its progress and problems. Furthermore, the general partner usu-
ally participated in the partnership as an owner. Since general partner re-
8. See Comment to § 1, 1916 ULPA, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 563 (1969); Caudill and Fendler,
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 59 CoM. L. J. 5 (1954); Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1917); Note, Partners and Limited Partners Under the Uniform
Acts, 36 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (1923); Comment, The Limited Partnership, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 105
(1954); Comment, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895 (1936).
9. See, e.g.. 1868 Kansas Sess. Laws, § 9, ch. 74: 1822 N.Y. Laws, § 8. ch. 244; PIERCE'S
WASH. CODE ANN. tit. 377, 88 7, 9 (1912).
10. See, e.g., 1868 Kansas Sess. Laws, § 16, ch. 74; CAL. CIV. CODE § 2501 (1880) (current
version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 15525 (West 1977)); PIERCE'S WASH. CODE ANN. tit. 377, § 11 (1912).
I1. In re Merrill, 17 F. Cas. 82 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 9,467); Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa.
315, 18 A. 397 (1889).
12. Henningsen v. Bamard, 117 Cal. App. 2d 352, 359, 255 P.2d 837, 841 (1953); 6 U.L.A.,
supra note 8, at 563-64; Caudill and Fendler, supra note 8; 36 HARV. L. REV., supra note 8: Crane.
Are Limited Partnerships Necessary?, 17 MINN. L. REV. 351 (1933).
13. 1916ULPA, supranote2, at§ 11.
14. Lewis, supra note 8, at 723.
15. -[T]he limited partnership was conceived to accommodate only a few limited part-
ners ." A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 146.
Small, consensual partnerships apparently dominated until recently. One observer states that small
limited partnerships predominated in California until 1968 when new securities regulations geared to
transferable limited partner interests in larger partnerships were adopted. Hrusoff and Cazares, For-
mation of the Public Limited Partnership, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 87 (1977). In his study of 345 limited
partnerships registered in Oregon in 1960, Bayse found that only nine involved total investments in
excess of $100,000 and only four had more than fifteen limited partners. Bayse, A Survey of the
Limited-Partnership Form of Business Organization, 42 OR. L. REv. 35, 59 (1962).
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wards resulted from partnership success rather than from salary, fees, or
other returns, there was a continuity of interest between the general and
the limited partners. 16 The 1916 ULPA should be read with this back-
ground in mind.
B. Limited Partner Rights Under the 1916 Act
1. ApprovalRights
The 1916 ULPA requires limited partners to sign both the partnership
certificate and all amendments thereto. 17 The latter requirement has been
routinely circumvented in practice by the appointment by limited partners
of an attorney-in-fact authorized to approve amendments. 
18
The Act provides that for certain amendments specific limited partner
consent is necessary. The two most important of these are: first, that spe-
cific limited partner approval is required for admission of a new general
partner;' 9 second, that unless otherwise provided in the partnership certif-
icate, specific consent is required to continue the partnership after with-
drawal of a general partner. 20
In addition, the general partner cannot, without limited partner ap-
proval, do any of the following:
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate, (b) Do any act which
would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of the partner-
ship, (c) Confess a judgment against the partnership, (d) Possess partner-
ship property, or assign their rights in specific partnership property, for
other than a partnership purpose, . . . (f) Admit a person as a limited
partner, unless the right so to do is given in the certificate .... 21
2. Access to Partnership Information
Accurate information is a prerequisite to investor oversight. The 1916
ULPA requires general partners to provide true and full information about
the partnership on reasonable demand. 22 The limited partners have the
right to have the partnership books kept at the partnership's place of busi-
16. UPA, supra note 6, § 18(f) provides: "No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in
the partnership business.-.." This rule applies to general partners in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary. It creates continuity of interest among the partners in the sense that partnership suc-
cess is the only source of return for both the general and the limited partners. In contrast, a general
partner benefits from receiving higher fees at the expense of the partnership and the limited partners.
17. 1916ULPA, supranote2, at§§2,25.
18. See D. AUGUSTI & R. LOWELL, REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONs 88 (1972).
19. 1916ULPA, supranote2, at§ 9(l)(e).
20. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 9(l)(g).
21. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 9.
22. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 10(a),(b).
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ness and the right to inspect and copy them. 23 However, the 1916 ULPA
does not require any disclosure except on demand of a limited partner.
Therefore major changes in or problems with the partnership may go
undisclosed.
3. Access to the Courts
The 1916 ULPA provides that generally a limited partner is not a
proper party to a partnership suit. 24 However, the 1916 ULPA gives lim-
ited partners the same right as general partners to petition a court for an
accounting and dissolution of the partnership. 25 In addition, the 1916
ULPA provides limited partners with a special fight to seek judicial disso-
lution of the partnership if they fail to receive a distribution to which they
are entitled under the Act. 26 Partners in a limited partnership are protected
by section 21 of the Uniform Partnership Act dealing with the fiduciary
duties of partners.2 7 Section 21 provides:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. 28
Section 21 has sometimes permitted limited partners to recover in court
for partnership losses resulting from general partner self-dealing. 29
C. Restricting Limited Partner Participation-The Control Section
The relative powerlessness of limited partners under the 1916 ULPA is
reinforced by section 7-the control section. Section 7 provides that "[a]
limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in ad-
dition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he
takes part in the control of the business." 30
The passive role of limited partners under the 1916 Act reflected the
then-popular view that limited liability is a privilege. 3' Given this view,
23. Id.
24. "A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings by or
against a partnership except where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability
to the partnership." 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 26.
25. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 10(2)(b),(c).
26. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 16(4).
27. Section 6 of the UPA, supra note 6, incorporates the UPA into the 1916 ULPA.
28. UPA, supra note 6, at § 21.
29. See notes 55-61 and accompanying text infra.
30. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at §7.
31. See note 8 supra.
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some limitation on control was probably a necessary element of an act
that would be acceptable to state legislatures. In addition, section 7 was
designed to protect the reasonable expectations of creditors who relied on
the liability of an active limited partner.32
The 1916 ULPA nowhere defines control. 33 The drafters apparently
saw section 7 as consistent with some limited partner involvement. Their
Comments to the Act state that:
No public policy requires a person who contributes to the capital of a busi-
ness, acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree of control over the
conduct of the business, to become bound for the obligations of the busi-
ness; provided creditors have no reason to believe at the times their credits
were extended that such person was so bound. 34
While this comment permits control so long as it does not create reliance,
section 7 does not mention reliance. 35 As a result, interpretation has been
difficult.
The 1916 ULPA grants limited partners minimal approval rights and no
routine access to partnership information. The primary power available to
limited partners is recourse to the courts. Section 7 has operated to restrict
limited partner efforts to maintain firsthand contact with partnership ac-
tivities. It is clear that, under the 1916 ULPA, the limited partner is to be
a passive investor.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP-THE 1916 UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ACT AS APPLIED
A. Modern Limited Partnerships
One of the greatest changes in the modem use of the limited partner-
ship is the organization of limited partnerships designed to take advantage
of special tax features available to businesses that qualify for partnership
32. The concern with creditor protection embodied in section 7 is discussed in Coleman &
Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30 Sw. L.J. 887, 897 (1976).
33. Control is mentioned, but not discussed, in the Official Comment to section I of the 1916
ULPA, supra note 2. It is not defined there or in the act itself. There is no comment to section 7.
34. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § 1, Official Comment.
35. This is more significant because other sections providing general liability for limited partners
condition this result on the reliance of the complaining third party. See id. § 6 (liability to those who
suffer loss through reliance on false statements in the certificate) and id. § 5 (liability for any wrong-
ful use of limited partner's name in partnership name to those without actual knowledge of limited
liability of limited partner).
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tax treatment. 36 Some of these "tax shelter" partnerships are very
large. 37
The combination of partnership taxation, limited liability for investors,
and control vested in the general partners has proven attractive for opera-
tion of a wide range of businesses. 38 While today a significant number of
limited partnerships continue to fit the 1916 model of a smaller face-to-
face structure with a negotiated agreement, many limited partnerships are
relatively impersonal combinations of managing general partners and un-
involved limited partner-investors. The general partner will often orga-
nize the proposed partnership activity and structure; only then does he or
36. Under the so-called Kintner regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (1960), limited part-
nerships organized under the 1916 ULPA are classified as partnerships rather than as associations
taxable as corporations. Tax classification of limited partnerships is discussed in the following arti-
cles: Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tar Shelters. 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 408 (1977), Fisher, Classification Under Section 7701-The Past, Present, and
Prospects for the Future, 30 TAX LAW. 627 (1977). See also Note, Tax Classification of Limited
Partnerships, 90 HARV. L. REV. 745 (1977). For a discussion of classification under the 1976 ULPA
see, Haims & Strock, Federal Income Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships Formed Under the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489 (1978).
Partnership tax classification can offer substantial advantages to investors, particularly investors in
businesses with tax losses, since partnership losses are passed through to the partners and may be
deducted from gross income they receive from other sources, at least to the extent the partner is "at
risk." Certain types of businesses offer substantial opportunities for tax losses; in some of these,
special tax provisions create opportunities to increase tax losses or to obtain them earlier than other-
wise possible. Examples are the accelerated depreciation available to some real estate ventures,
I.R.C. §167(j), (k) (1980), and the option of amortizing a partnership's organization and syndication
expenses over five years, I.R.C. § 709(b) (1980). Partnership taxation also allows income which
would be classified as capital gains to the partnership to be treated as capital gains by the partners.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, §§ 201-14, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in
scattered sections of the I.R.C.) limits the tax shelter opportunities offered by the Code. Substantial
tax shelter opportunities remain, however, particularly in real estate. Tax lawyers are busy exploring
possible ways to expand tax shelter opportunities within the new limits. See 34 Bus. LAW., supra
note I, at 281-305 for a discussion of the practical impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Regarding partnership taxation and the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, see Wiesner, Tar
Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 33 TAX L. REV. 5 (1977); Tal
Shelters: The Decline of the Limited Partnership, 28 CORP. J. 99 (1978). See also Long, Real Estate
Partnerships Under the New Tax Law, 7 REAL EST. REV. 30 (Spring 1977).
37. A collection of the prospectuses and other materials of a number of large limited partnership
offerings may be found in I NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS (S. Roulac ed. 1972). The development of
larger, less personal limited partnerships is discussed in Hrusoff & Cazares, supra note 15.
38. The opportunity to combine limited liability with the tax sheltering opportunities of partner-
ship taxation is the essential attraction of tax shelter partnerships. For many businesses, however, the
limited partnership form may be attractive if substantial profits are not anticipated. In particular, this
structure may appeal to entrepreneurs since it permits them to obtain equity funds without sacrificing
control.
When a business is profitable, however, particularly if it intends to retain earnings, corporate taxa-
tion is preferable since corporate income is taxed at low corporate rates in the year realized and is
taxed to the shareholder only when distributed. Partnership profits, on the other hand, are taxed to the
partners in the year they are realized whether or not they are distributed.
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she seek investors. The partnership agreement is not negotiated. 39 And
the investor may know little about the proposed area of partnership ac-
tivity. A limited partnership statute should be designed to meet the needs
of the full range of limited partnerships.
Tax-oriented limited partnerships are trouble prone. Typical invest-
ment activities, such as real estate and mineral exploration, are complex
and risky.40 Often business risks are compounded by heavy borrowing,
which adds a substantial element of financial risk.41 The projects are often
hard to evaluate. 42 Investors are apt to focus on potential tax savings and
may fail to consider adequately the weakness of the underlying business
39. Roulac compares partnership agreements in larger limited partnerships to adhersion con-
tracts. Roulac, Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical and Procedural Problems, 10
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 276, 280 (1975). The typical structure of real estate partnerships is
described in Hacker & Rotunda, Sponsors of Real Estate Partnerships as Brokers and Investment
Advisors, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 322, 324-26 (1975).
40. See discussion and references in Murdock, Tax Sheltered Securities: Is There a Broker-
Dealer in the Woodwork?, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 518,527-30 (1974). See also SECURrIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, (Doc. 723-95731, Oct. 12, 1972) [hereinafter cited as THE DICKEY REPORT].
41. "Investments made by numerous tax shelter partnership programs are highly leveraged with
a view toward improving the rate of return on the equity capital contributions of the limited part-
ners. . . . Use of high leverage vastly increases the risk associated with mortgage-financed real
estate operations, especially that of foreclosure, if sufficient funds cannot be generated to cover such
financing." THE DICKEY REPORT, supra note 40, at 69. See, e.g., 1 NOTABLE SYNDICATIONS, supra
note 37, at 7 (proposed 90% leveraging in "American Housing Partners" prospectus); Hayes &
Harlan, Caveat Emptor in Real Estate Equities, 50 HARv. Bus. REv. 86, 88-90 (1972). A partner
can deduct losses only to the extent of that partner's tax basis (and not more in one year than the
actual capital invested). Since leverage can increase the investor's tax basis in the partnership, lever-
age can make a partnership more attractive from a tax shelter point of view. The Tax Reform Act of
1976 limited this shelter for non-real estate ventures. See note 36 supra.
42. "The salesman of real estate securities is purveying a commodity more intricate than most
securities. Even a sophisticated investor may have difficulty in evaluating the tax aspects of an offer-
ing, or the factors of risk and promoters' benefits ..... " SECURrIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DoC.
No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 588 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. The difficul-
ties are aggravated by "extremely optimistic" projections and sales materials. THE DICKEY REPORT,
supra note 40, at 35-37. See also, T. ANDERSON, OIL PROGRAM INvESTMENTs, 80-102 (1972);
Creamer & Deutschman, FHA Syndications Under the Microscope, 2 REAL EST. REv. 10-11 (Fall
1972) (discussing the difficulties of evaluating conventional real estate proposals).
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activity. 43 Failure of the partnership business 44 or of the promoter-general
partner45 is common.
In addition, limited partnerships are fertile ground for self-dealing and
conflicts of interest. 46 Promoters often are involved in more than one lim-
ited partnership and may also be principals in businesses doing business
with the partnership. 47 The interrelationships may become extremely
43. "Wittingly or unwittingly, fiscal policy has focused investors' attention so single-mindedly
on the tax-saving opportunities in real estate development that investors tend to neglect the basic
project economics." Hayes & Harlan, supra note 41, at 94.
As a result, investors are routinely urged to pay attention to the basic soundness of the proposed
business. See, e.g., D. AUGUSTINE & R. LOWELL, supra note 18, at 370. Mosburg concludes that the
"market appeal of tax shelter offerings will see many poorly structured and poorly managed ventures
purchased by the investing public." Mosburg, Regulation of Tax Shelter Investments, 25 OKLA. L.
REV. 207, 238 (1972). In discussing fraudulent energy offerings, the S.E.C. states that investors are
often induced to invest on "the basis of false statements or omissions concerning . . . the risks
associated with the investments [and] the experience of the issurers' principals. . . . One of the
major inducements to investors is the purported availability of special tax benefits." SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 45TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIISSION 38
(1979) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as 45TH ANNUAL REP.].
44. See, e.g., Blattberg v. Weiss, 61 Misc. 2d 564, 306 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (inability
to fully lease partnership office building led to mortgage foreclosure); Dycus v. Belco Industries.
Inc., 569 P.2d 553 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) (partnership hotel proved unprofitable); Watson v. Limited
Partners of WCKT, Ltd., 570 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (builder organized a limited part-
nership to buy and rent four-plexes he had built; the partnership experienced continuing losses and
finally in winding up the partnership the four-plexes were sold at a trustees sale. The buyer? The
general partner-builder.).
45. Of course, general partner failure often causes partnership failure. See, e.g., Glantz v.
Cohan, 364 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (failing general partners were unable to meet com-
mitments to the limited partnership; as a result, the partnership failed); Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md.
119, 223 A.2d 240 (Ct. App. 1966) (corporation used partnership assets to try to meet its obligations,
and this led to partnership failure); McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 218 A.2d 408 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1966), aff d, 95 N.J. Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (failing
corporate general partner siphoned off partnership funds to try to keep corporation afloat); Mist Prop-
erties Inc. v. Fitzsimmons Realty Co., 228 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (corporation allegedly
used proceeds from loan secured by partnership property for corporate purposes; inability to make
resulting mortgage payments resulted in foreclosure and sale of partnership property).
46. See D. AUGUSTINE & R. LOWELL, supra note 18, at 170; Little & Drasner, The Tax Shelter: A
Reappraisal, 10 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 67, 83 (1976). The Dickey Report states:
Promoters of real estate securities appear to be exposed to more conflicts of interest than do
traditional corporate promoters ...
The structure of the typical real estate syndication does offer significant opportunities for self-
dealing, and there are few controls (for example, independent directors and stockholder ap-
proval) comparable to corporate democracy. In real estate offerings, those who are managing the
business have a direct monetary interest in the way the funds are used; the promoters themselves
run the business and rarely have the constraint of outside directors. In addition, because of part-
nership law restrictions on the activities of the limited partner, the limited partners cannot act as
effective regulators.
THE DICKEY REPORT, supra note 40, at 40-41.
47. Promoters typically develop a business opportunity and organize a limited partnership to
finance it. They typically act as general partner, though a promoter affiliate may play this role. In a
real estate development, a promoter might identify an appropriate property, obtain an option on it.
generate construction plans, and obtains bids and financing commitments. At some point in this pro-
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complex. For example, limited partnerships may be formed to finance
assets used in other general partner ventures. General partner affiliates
may manage or develop partnership property48 or lease partnership assets
for use in another business. 49 The resulting conflicts of interest create fer-
tile ground for abuse. General partners may agree to pay themselves or
their affiliates excessive fees for services. 50 Or they may sell assets to the
cess, the promoter develops a prospectus which presents the plan, insofar as it is then known, to
potential investors. A limited partnership is formed and investors become its limited partners. Be-
cause the promoter is more of an organizer than an employee, the promoter can readily organize and
manage more than one partnership at a time. Thus, unlike the typical small operating business, man-
agement of the partnership is not a full time undertaking and the general partner can readily partici-
pate in more than one partnership and at several levels of a real estate undertaking at one time. (There
are of course many variations.)
For an example of the complex roles that a promoter may play, see Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-
Continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1960). There Homestake, the general partner,
mined uranium. Mid-Continent, the limited partnership, was formed to construct a mill to process
uranium, including uranium mined by the general partner. Mid-Continent was to mill "custom ore"
mined independently, as well. Homestake later created another limited partnership, Sapin, to engage
in uranium mining and processing in the same area.
The conflict of interest problems in this series of transactions were substantial. In court, questions
were raised about Homestake's alleged use of Mid-Continent's assets to develop Sapin, and about
the diversion of "custom ore" by Homestake from Mid-Continent to Sapin. Other issues included
Homestake's secrecy in organizing Sapin and the question of whether Sapin was organized to take
advantage of a partnership opportunity which was Mid-Continent's, or alternatively, whether Home-
stake had a duty to offer limited partners in Mid-Continent the opportunity to invest in Sapin.
48. See, e.g., Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1966). In that case, the partnership was structured to pay the general partner a fixed fee for
managing the partnership hotel, which was leased to Sheraton. The suit arose when the general part-
ner allegedly renegotiated the lease and thereby reduced partnership income without affecting general
partner earnings. See also Lerman v. Tenney, 295 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd. 425 F.2d
236 (2d Cir. 1970) (partnership was formed to acquire, modernize, and lease an office building).
49. This kind of limited partnership enables a business to obtain outside financing for a major
investment. The partnership generates tax losses through asset depreciation while generating a cash
flow from lease payments. The limited partners thus receive tax losses, cash distributions, and an
equity interest in the asset, which may appreciate in value, especially if real estate is involved.
For example, in Elle v. Babbitt, 259 Or. 590, 488 P.2d 440 (1971), the corporate general partner
organized a limited partnership to buy a pipe mill and lease it back to the corporation. In Allen v.
Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223 A.2d 240 (1966), the partnership purchased land from a developer to be
leased back to the developer, who happened also to be a general partner affiliate, for development of
housing and a shopping center.
50. The Dickey Report notes "the complexity of existing compensation arrangements, the
abuses therein in the offering of real estate interests, and the high level of compensation to manage-
ment in relation to the risk they assume, as opposed to the public investor." THE DICKEY REPORT,
supra note 40, at 48. See also SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 42, at 578; Comment, Public Limited
Partnerships in Northwest Real Estate Syndication, 7 WiuAmmrr L.J. 74, 74-82 (1971).
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partnership 5' or lease partnership assets52 at terms unfavorable to the part-
nership.
Concern about these and other problems became acute in the early
seventies. 53 One result was a host of new securities rules, guidelines, and
51. Probably the most basic, widespread and dangerous abuse involved in [real estate syndica-
tion] is the selling of properties to syndications at inflated prices or subject to inflated or unfeasi-
ble financing arrangements. . . . This is caused generally by the syndicator's several conflicts
of interest, the techniques used to package the tax shelter, and the conflict between these tech-
niques and intrinsically sound investment objectives.
THE DICKEY REPORT, supra note 40, at 44. See also materials cited at note 53 infra.
In Bassan v. Investment Exchange Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974), the general part-
ner purchased land, then sold it to the partnership for profits which ranged from 33% to 280% over a
period of 5 years. The court held that, in respect to the sale under review, the profits made by the
general partner (44%) were excessive. Finding that the limited partners had not consented to these
profits, the court held that the transaction breached the general partner fiduciary duty to the limited
partners. The case is noted in 50 WASH. L. REV. 977 (1975).
52. See, e.g., Riviera Congress Ass'n v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966). In 1961 the general partners organized the partnership to purchase a hotel to be
leased to a manager. The hotel was leased to a series of general partner affiliates. (Ultimately, the
lease was assigned to the owner partnership, which, unable to pay itself rent payments, ceased mak-
ing promised distributions to the limited partners). The court found that the limited partners had
consented to the self-dealing. Hence, the court held there was no general partner liability to the inves-
tors unless the trial court on remand found a lack of good faith by the general partners.
In McGlynn v. Schultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 218 A.2d 408 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966). affd. 95
N.J. Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967), the corporate general partner proposed
to acquire a shopping center, transfer it at a profit to a limited partnership it organized, and then to
lease it from the partnership on terms which would give the limited partners a return of 9-10% on
their investment. The plan was to purchase the center for $400,000 cash (and a mortgage of about
$1,450,000) and to sell it to the partnership for approximately $320,000 profit. (The general partners
were held liable for use of partnership funds for non-partnership purposes, a breach of their obligation
as trustee. After using all the partnership's money, the corporation went bankrupt, leaving the part-
nership with nothing).
In discussing conflicts of interest in oil and gas investments, T. ANDERSON, supra note 42, at
57-60, points out the benefits that sponsors can obtain by selling land to a partnership while retaining
adjoining land. Exploration by the partnership can provide the sponsor with a free estimate of re-
source potential on adjoining land. Success will dramatically increase the value of sponsor's adjoin-
ing land at no cost to the sponsor. A number of similar scenarios are discussed.
53. See THE DICKEY REPORT, supra note 40; Heyman and Pamall, Use (or Abuse) of the Limited
Partnership in Financing Real Estate Ventures in New Mexico, 3 N.M. L. REV. 251 (1973); Mos-
burg, supra note 43; Note, Proposed Regulation of Limited Partnership Investment Programs, 6 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 465 (1973); Comment, Regulation of Real Estate Syndications: An Overview, 49
WASH. L. REv. 137 (1973); Comment, supra note 50.
For earlier materials dealing with these concerns, see SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 42, at 575-91
(Real Estate Securities); Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for
Protection, 69 YALE L.J. 725 (1960).
In the early 1970's there was a great deal of regulatory activity as well. See materials cited at note
54 infra.
Concern with these problems has continued. See recent regulatory activities cited in note 54 infra.
See also 45th ANNUAL REP., supra note 43, at 38-39 (Enforcement Program: Energy Related Cases);
R. HAFT & P. FASS, TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS 3-40 (4 Securities Law Series, rev. 1980); Little &
Drassner, supra note 46.
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regulations 54 directed to the problems of larger limited partnerships.
Any revision of limited partnership statutes should reconsider the lim-
ited partner's role in light of the current use and structure of limited part-
nerships. Limited liability is no longer viewed as a special privilege; the
need of passive investors for some protections is now widely recognized.
These changes create new flexibility to meet the problems of the investor
in the modem limited partnership.
B. Expanding Protection for Limited Partners
1. Through the Courts
As the 1916 model of the typical limited partnership fit fewer and fewer
actual limited partnerships, limited partners sought to stretch the available
remedies to solve new problems. Where there were clear abuses by gen-
eral partners, courts were often willing to expand the existing remedies.55
The general partner's statutory fiduciary duty56 does not encompass many
of the aspects of a fiduciary's duties at common law. 57 Noting the simi-
larity of the limited partner's position to that of a corporate shareholder,
the courts have sometimes expanded the general partner's fiduciary duty
54. See S.E.C. GUIDE 60, PREPARATION OF REGISTRATION STATEMENTS RELATING TO INTERESTS IN
REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, reprinted in 4 R. HAFi"& P. FAss, supra note 53, at Appendix
C; The Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1972. S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 26964
(1972); MIDWEST SECURITIES COMMISSIONERS ASS'N, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING REAL ESTATE
PROGRAMS, (adopted by Midwest Security Commissioners Ass'n on Feb. 28, 1973, amended Feb.
26, 1974, July 22, 1975 and adopted by the North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) on April 15, 1980), reprinted in [1980] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4821 [hereinafter
cited as MIDWEST POLICY]; MIDWEST SECURITmES COMMISSIONERS ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR REGISTRA-
TION OF PUBLICLY-OFFERED CATTLE-FEEDING PROGRAMS, (adopted Feb. 28, 1973) reprinted in [1980]
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4811 [hereinafter cited as CATTLE-FEEDING GUIDELINES]; NORTH AMERI-
CAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE REGISTRATION OF OIL AND GAS
PROGRAMS (adopted Sept. 22, 1976, amended Oct. 12, 1977 and Oct. 31, 1979), reprinted in [1980]
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4582 [hereinafter cited as NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES]; WASH.
ADMIN. CODE ch. 460.32A (1979); Real Estate Programs, CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, §§ 260.140.-
110-119.1 (adopted (June 20, 1973), and Oil and Gas Interests, CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, §§
260.140.120-131.9 (adopted Dec. 6, 1974).
55. See, e.g., Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lichtyger v. Franchard
Corp. 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966); Millard v. Newmark & Co., 24
App. Div. 2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1966).
For an excellent discussion, see Note, Procedures and Remedies in Limited Partners' Suits for
Breach of General Partner's Fiduciary Duty, 90 HARv. L. REv. 763 (1977).
56. UPA, supra note 6, at § 21.
57. A corporate director has a duty of loyalty to the corporation, Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503,
510-I1 (Del. 1939), and a duty to exercise care in performing the duties of director. Litwin v. Allen,
25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677-78 (Sup. Ct. 1940). These duties have been incorporated into the corporate
codes of many jurisdictions. See, e.g., the suggested provision in ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 35 (1953).
Washington Law Review Vol. 56:99, 1980
by analogy to the duties of corporate directors. 58 In addition, courts often
have permitted limited partners to initiate partner derivative and repre-
sentative suits. 59 However, some courts have refused to broaden the stat-
utory rights. 60 Others have raised substantial procedural barriers. 61 As a
result, limited partner remedies are unreliable.
2. Through Legislation and Regulation
Some legislatures have sought to increase limited partner power by per-
mitting them to vote on such matters as:
(a) Election, removal, or substitution of general partners, including, but not
limited to, transfer of a majority of the voting stock of a corporate general
partner.
(b) Termination of the partnership.
(c) Amendment of the partnership agreement.
(d) Sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership. 62
58. Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223 A.2d 240, 246 (Ct. App. 1966) (fiduciary duty ex-
tends to disclosure at time of investment); Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 536. 223
N.E.2d 869, 873, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377, 383 (1966) ("no basis or warrant for distinguishing the fiduci-
ary reltionship of corporate director and shareholder from that of general partner . . . [tlhe princi-
ple is the same-those in control of a business must deal fairly with the interests of the other inves-
tors."); Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976) (partnership opportunity doctrine).
See Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IOWA L. REV. 902 (1963). See also T. AUGUSTINE & R.
LOWELL, supra note 18, at 167-74; Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 32, at 915-17:90 HARV. L.
REV. 763, supra note 55.
59. Klebanow v. New York Produce Exchange, 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965); Smith v. Bader,
458 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying California law; California law permits partner deriva-
tive suits); Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869. 277 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1966) (partner representative); Riviera Congress Ass'n v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 223 N.E.2d 876.
277 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1966) (partner derivative suit).
See generally Note, Standing of Limited Partners to Sue DerivativelV, 65 COLUI. L. REV. 1463
(1965). A few states have amended their limited partnership acts to permit limited partner derivative
suits. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1732 (1979); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 115-a to -c (McKinney
Supp. 1968); OR. REV. STAT. § 69.475 (1979).
60. Lieberman v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 62 Wn. 2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963) (limited partner
not a proper party to sue for partnership insurance proceeds).
61. Blattberg v. Weiss, 61 Misc. 2d 564, 306 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (court stated that
although the partnership had no assets, limited partners must seek a judicial accounting prior to suing
for a return of contribution. The decision was handed down five years after the foreclosure and sale of
the partnership property from which limited partners sought recovery, claiming that mortgage was
improper.) Riviera Congress Ass'n v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386, 392-93 (1966) (in suits for breach of fiduciary duty, limited partner knowledge or
consent is a defense.) Mist Properties v. Fitzsimmons Realty Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(limited partner consent to mortgage of partnership property for non-partnership purpose is binding
against third parties.)
62. WASH. REV. CODE § 25.08.070 (1979) (enacted 1972 Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess. ch. 113
sec. 2). See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507 (West 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.080 (1973); OR.
REV. STAT. § 69.280 (1979). Delaware has amended section 7 to permit limited partners to exercise
approval rights granted in the partnership agreement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1707 (1974).
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These voting powers, however, exist only if they are also granted to lim-
ited partners in the partnership certificate. Often they are not. 63
State and federal securities regulators have established rules and regu-
lations addressing the special needs of investors in tax-shelter pro-
grams. 64 These rules establish explicit disclosure requirements for com-
mon types of tax shelter investments. 65 They set experience and net worth
requirements for general partners66 and eligibility requirements for inves-
tors. 67 They regulate self-dealing through prohibitions of certain types of
63. In part this is due to concern that voting rights may lead to section 7 liability for limited
partners. See note 73 infra.
64. See note 54 supra.
65. In addition to substantial pre-investment disclosure requirements, the regulations typically
require continuing reporting throughout the life of the partnership. For example California requires
quarterly unaudited financial reports and quarterly reports containing other pertinent information
about the partnership as well as an annual report that should include audited financial statements, a
report of activities, and a comparison of performance with prior projections. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit.
10, § 260.140.116.3 (1977); MIDWEST POLICY, supra note 54, at § VII C.
Washington has regulations covering sales efforts, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A.185 (1977);
prospectuses, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A. 195 (1977); required disclosure of sponsor experi-
ence, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A.196 (1977); use of projections in sales materials, WASH. AD-
MIN. CODE § 460.32A.245 (1977). Other provisions require ongoing reporting, WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 460.32A. 160 (1977), including reports on any real property acquired in the preceding quarter,
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A.245 (1977).
66. Typically, limited partnership promoters must have a net worth greater than or equal to the
lesser of either 5% of the value of all offerings sold in the preceding 12 months plus 5% of the present
offering, or $1,000,000. E.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A.015 (1977): CAL. ADMINr. CODE, tit.
10, § 260.140.111.2 (1974); NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § II B; MIDWEST
POLICY, supra note 54, at § II B.
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that a corporate general partner must have a
net worth of at least 10-15% (depending on offering size) of the offering for a program to obtain an
advance ruling that it will be taxable as a partnership. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
Real estate program sponsors and general partners are normally required to have two years of
relevant experience. They, or any affiliates, if they propose to provide services to the program, must
either have four years of experience providing that service or demonstrate adequate experience and
knowledge to provide the service. E.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.140.111.1 (1974); MID-
WEST POLICY, supra note 54, at § It A.
In oil programs, the general partner must have three years of relevant experience and four years
experience in any type of service provided to the program. E.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.-
140.122.1 (1974); NASAA OILAND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § II A.
67. Investor eligibility requirements are intended to ensure that investors can bear the risks of the
investment and can benefit from the tax shelter offered. Mosburg, supra note 43, at 531. California
premises its investor requirements on the lack of liquidity of most tax shelter offerings and on their
tax orientation. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.140.112.1 (1974).
It is commonly recommended that real estate program investors have a net worth of $75,000 or net
worth of $20,000 and an annual gross income of $20,000 (net worth measured exclusive of home,
furnishings, and auto). E.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.140.112.5 (1973); MIDWEST POLICY,
supra note 54, at § III B 2 c.
NASAA recommends that oil and gas program investors have a net worth of $225,000 or a net
worth of $60,000 and an annual income of $60,000 (net worth measured exclusive of home, furnish-
ings, and auto). NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § IV B 2 c. California requires
either a net worth of $200,000 or a net worth of $50,000 and a marginal income tax rate of 50% or
more. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.140.123.2 (1974).
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dealings and through ceilings on general partner remuneration. 68 They set
standards for asset transactions between the partnership and the spon-
sor. 69 They deal with conflicts of interest, 70 assessments, 71 and fiduciary
duty. 72 They require partnerships to give limited partners voting rights. 73
68. The Midwest Policy sets a standard of reasonableness for general partner/sponsor compensa-
tion and suggests limits for various types of compensation, including program participations. The
sponsor and affiliates may provide only certain services, primarily property management, and only at
the market rate. MIDWEST POLICY, supra note 54. at § IV and V E. Washington sets ceilings for
acquisition services, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A.057 (1977); for program management, WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 460.32A.030 (1977); and for commissions on property resale. WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 460.32A.057 (1977).
The NASAA Oil and Gas Guidelines require that organizational and offering expenses must be
reasonable and, with management fees, may not exceed 15% of the offering: they limit total general
partner compensation. NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § V.
69. California prohibits sale of assets from real estate sponsors to a partnership at more than cost
unless there has been a material change, such as passage of two or more years or successful rezoning.
which would increase the property value. Sales or leases by the partnership to the sponsor are prohi-
bited except for market rate, fully disclosed lease-backs. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, §
260.140.114. 1(b) (1974). Similar limits are recommended in both the MIDWEST POLICY, supra note
54, at § V A, and the NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § VI A.
Washington permits sales, leases, and loans between a limited partnership and the partnership's
sponsor only if such a plan is fully disclosed at the outset of the partnership. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
460.32A.045 (1977).
70. Most of the regulations include conflict-of-interest sections. Besides limiting sales and
leases, supra note 69, and fees and services, supra note 68, between sponsor and partnership, they
may prohibit loans to the sponsor, prohibit sponsor benefits derived from owning adjoining land
whose value is increased by the partnership program, and prohibit rebates, in all cases they require
full disclosure. See, e.g., MIDWEST POLICY, supra note 54, at § V; NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 54, at § VI.
71. Because some operating programs have required investors to make increased investments,
sometimes coupled with substantial penalties for failure to make them, the regulations normally limit
both amounts that may be demanded and penalties that may be imposed. Real estate programs are
often limited to demanding only amounts needed to cover taxes or other government assessments.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.140.116.8 (1977); MIDWEST POLICY, supra note 54, at § VII H.
California prohibits forfeitures for failure to make added investments. CAL. ADMIIN. CODE, tit. 10, §
260.140.116.9 (1973).
Oil and gas programs are limited to seeking a total of 100% of the initial investment, of which 25%
may be mandatory. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 260.140.128.8 (1974); NASAA OIL AND GAS
GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § VIII E.
72. Some regulations state a broad sponsor fiduciary duty. See, e.g., MIDWEST POLICY, supra
note 54, at § IX A; NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § VI B 2,5. Some limit the
effect of exculpatory clauses. See. e.g., CATTLE-FEEDING GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at § I F.
73. The regulations usually require that certain "partner democracy" provisions be included in
the partnership agreement of registered partnerships. Typically, 10% of the limited partners may call
a partnership meeting. Notice of such meetings is required. The general partner must provide access
to a current list of limited partners. The limited partners must be given the right, by majority vote, to:
(1) amend the partnership agreement, (2) dissolve the program, (3) remove the general partner and
elect a new general partner, and (4) approve or disapprove the sale of all or substantially all of the
partnership assets. The agreement must specify a method for valuation of the partnership interest of a
removed general partner. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, §§ 260.140.116.1, 260.140.116.2
(1977); MIDWEST POLICY, supra note 54, at §§ VII A and B.
In oil partnerships these rights must be provided, and in addition the limited partners must have the
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The effectiveness of these regulations in curbing abuses is uncertain. Fur-
thermore, many tax shelter investments are designed to be exempt from
registration requirements and, hence, from most of the regulations. 74
C. Interpretation of the Control Section
Section 7 has been one of the most heavily criticized sections of the
1916 ULPA. 75 While few cases interpreting section 7 have found limited
partners to be generally liable for exercising control, the language courts
have used in a number of cases has raised fears that limited partners might
become generally liable merely for exercising reasonable investor super-
vision. Section 7 has created a lack of certainty and an element of unpre-
dictability in partnership planning. It is a liability trap for the unwary. At
the same time, by threatening a heavy penalty for the limited partner who
exercises excessive control, the section has discouraged the careful lim-
ited partner from acting to resolve the partnership's financial or manage-
rial crises. Seeking to circumvent section 7 problems, some limited part-
nerships have been structured to permit limited partners to control a
corporate general partner. Recent decisions making these limited partners
generally liable have made this a risky approach. The problems created
power to vote to replace a withdrawing general partner and the right to cancel contracts for services
made between the partnership and the sponsor or affiliates. NASAA OIL AND GAS GUIDELINES, supra
note 54, at §§ VIn A, F.
The voting rights requirements are conditioned on conformity with state law. Because it is uncer-
tain whether these rights might constitute control in violation of section 7 of the 1916 ULPA, supra
note 2, their enforcement has been weak. See Augustine, Fass, Lester & Robinson, The Liability of
Limited Partners Having Certain Statutory Voting Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the Part-
nership, 31 Bus. LAw. 2087 (1976); Comment, Can Rights Required to be Given Limited Partners
Under New Tax Shelter Investment Regulations Be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act?, 26 OKLA L. REv. 289 (1973).
74. The SEC noted that "[it is impossible to state definitely how much the public has invested in
real estate investment partnerships, corporations, and trusts, since a major portion of the public offer-
ings have been made locally in intrastate offerings. Such offerings are exempted from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933. ... SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 42, at 576 (emphasis added).
This remains true. See Comment, Real Estate Limited Partnerships and Allocational Efficiency: The
Incentive to Suefor Securities Fraud, 63 VA. L. REv. 669, 670 n. 10 (1977).
75. "The Section of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act that has caused the most difficulty is
Section 7 .... "Freidberg, Limited Partnerships: A Non-Tax Analysis, 32 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx.
1363, 1366 (1974). The most serious problem in drafting a limited partnership agreement is deter-
mining what "control" under section 7 is. Coleman & Weatherbie, supra note 32, at 897.
The leading article critically analyzing section 7 is Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partner-
ships, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1471 (1969). See also Feldman, The Limited Partner's Participation in the
Control of the Partnership Business, 50 CONN. B.J. 168 (1976); Comment, "Control" in the Limited
Partnership, 7 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PRoc. 416 (1973); Comment, Limited Partner Control and
Liability Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 32 Sw. L.J. 1301 (1979).
Washington Law Review
by section 7 have tended to discourage use of the limited partnership form
of business organization. 76
Under section 7, the courts have considered three aspects of limited
partner participation in limited partnerships: participation as limited part-
ners, participation as partnership employees, and participation as officers
or directors of a corporate general partner.
1. Participation as a Limited Partner
The relevent cases have all permitted some limited partner involve-
ment. In some cases quite extensive limited partner participation has been
permitted. However, dicta suggest a lack of consistent approach and a
danger that liability might be assessed for rather slight participation. This
has created continuing uncertainty.
Most courts have permitted limited partners to consult with and advise
the general partner, 77 although at least one court has suggested that where
advice carries great weight, the advising limited partner may be found to
exercise control. 78 Limited partners have been permitted to exercise pow-
ers given in the partnership agreement to approve extraordinary transac-
tions79 and asset sales. 80 Similarly, a limited partner agent was permitted
to share some authority with the general partner where his participation
could be terminated by the general partner. 81
A number of courts have permitted limited partners to bring derivative
suits on behalf of the partnership. 82 However, some courts have stated
that this limited partner participation was control in excess of that permit-
ted a limited partner and would make the suing limited partner generally
liable.83
Several courts have suggested that extensive limited partner participa-
76. "Neither the Act nor the decisions under it are very helpful on the critical question of how
much review, advisory, management selection, or veto power a limited partner may have without
being regarded as taking part in control. The resulting uncertainty is probably the greatest drawback
of the limited partnership form." A. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 147 (citations omitted). See also 32
Sw. L.J., supra note 75, at 1313.
77. Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957); Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo.
522. 272 P.2d 287 (1954) (en banc); Trans-Am Builders, Inc. v. Woods Mill, Ltd.. 133 Ga. App.
411, 210 S.E.2d 866 (1974); Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
78. 323A.2dat375.
79. Id.
80. Stone Mountain Properties, Ltd. v. Helmer, 139 Ga. App. 865, 229 S.E.2d 779 (1976).
81. Plasteel Products Corp. v. Eisenberg, 170 F. Supp. 100 (D. Mass. 1959) (alternative hold-
ing), affd on other grounds, sub nom., Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helman. 271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir.
1959).
82. See note 59 supra.
83. Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975); Executive Hotel
Associates v. Elm Hotel, 41 Misc. 2d 354, 245 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
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tion may be permitted in a partnership crisis, distinguishing such activity
from day-to-day management.8 4 In Garrett v. Koepke, 85 where limited
partners marshalled and distributed partnership assets after the general
partner resigned, the court decided that even if this was undue control, the
limited partners were not thereby liable for debts incurred prior to their
participation in management. 86
Holzman v. De Escamilla87 is the only case holding limited partners
liable under section 7 for their activities as limited partners. In Holzman,
the limited partners controlled partnership finances, overruled the general
partner as to crop decisions, and finally replaced the general partner with
a paid manager. Here the "limited partners" clearly controlled the part-
nership's affairs.
A few cases have emphasized creditor protection, finding that when a
creditor knew that the limited partner was a limited partner, there was no
reason to assess liability. 88 In Rathke v. Griffith89 the court held that ex-
cessive control had not been exercised although the limited partner was a
member of the partnership board (but never served in that capacity), had
helped negotiate a partnership loan agreement and a contractor's contract,
and had signed warranty deeds, loan agreements, leases, and a contract
on behalf of the partnership. The court gave great weight to the fact that
there was no evidence that the creditor knew of any of these acts of con-
trol.90
2. Participation as an Employee
Cases considering limited partners as employees have generally held
that limited partners may be employed by the partnership so long as they
lack final authority in such areas as hiring or credit extension and do not
control partnership finances. 91 Courts examine each case closely to see
84. Well v. Diversified Properties, 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970); Trans-Am Builders, Inc. v.
Woods Mill, Ltd., 133 Ga. App. 411,210 S.E.2d 866 (1974).
85. 569 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
86. The court decided that there was no liability even if conrol had been exercised since, in any
case, the credit was extended before control was exercised. Id. at 571.
87. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
88. Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954) (en banc).
89. 36 Wn. 2d 394,407-08,218 P.2d 757,764(1950).
90. "[I]t is not alleged that respondent ever relied on Mr. Griffith's position as a general partner,
or in fact ever understood that Mr. Griffith was anything other than a limited partner." Id. at 408, 218
P.2d at 764.
91. Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848, 850 (1957) (Limited partner acted as
new car sales manager; court emphasized that he did not hire or fire; he ordered new cars with general
partner authorization, and co-signed checks only when requested to do so by the office manager in the
general partner's absence. Held, no control); Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287, 290
(1954) (en banc) (Limited partner ran repair shop: although he bought parts and advised the general
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that the limited partner does not in fact exercise substantial independent
control.92
3. Participation as an Officer or Director of a Corporate General
Partner
Several recent cases have considered whether a limited partner who
controls the partnership as an officer or director of the corporate general
partner should become personally liable. 93 Some courts have held that the
purpose of section 7 is creditor protection. These courts have refused to
assess liability where control was exercised through a corporate general
partner since in that case there was no basis for creditor reliance. 94 Two
courts have refused to read in a reliance requirement and have found lia-
bility. 95 In both cases considerations favoring disregard of the corporate
entity entered into the court's decision. 96 Because of this split in ap-
proach, exercise of control through a corporate general partner is risky
under section 7.
IV. THE 1976 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
A. Limited Partner Rights
While the 1976 ULPA makes a number of changes in provisions affect-
ing limited partners, the rights granted under the Act are not substantially
different from those granted under the 1916 ULPA. Approval rights have
been reduced somewhat while access to the courts has been facilitated.
partner he was not authorized to extend credit except to those persons he knew personally, and the
general partner controlled partnership finances. Held, no control).
92. Gast v. Petsinger, 228 Pa. Super. 394, 323 A.2d 371, 375 (1974) (two of the limited partners
served as consultants to a highly technical partnership business; court reversed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for these limited partners, holding that the facts must be examined to ascertain
whether the limited partners had decision-making authority that could not be checked or nullified by
the general partner).
93. A number of recent casenotes discuss these cases and the problems they create. See Note,
The Corporation as Managing Partner in a Limited Partnership. 55 N.D. L. REv. 271 (1979); 31
OKLA. L. REV. 997 (1978); 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 355 (1978); 53 WASH. L. REV. 775 (1977).
94. Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enterprises, 70 Cal. App. 3d 714, 729-30, 138
Cal. Rptr. 918, 926-27 (1977); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wn. 2d 400,
404-05, 562 P.2d 244, 246-47 (1977) (en banc).
95. Mursor Builders, Inc. v. Crown Mountain Apartment Associates, 467 F. Supp. 1316,
1333-34 (D. V.I. 1978); Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1975).
96. In Delaney, the court emphasized that the corporate general partner had been formed specifi-
cally to manage the limited partnership and had no independent existence. 526 S.W.2d at 545. In
Frigidaire, the Washington court distinguished Delaney on this basis. 88 Wn. 2d at 403, 562 P.2d at
246. In Mursor, the limited partners had intermingled personal, corporate, and partnership finances.




The 1976 ULPA requires all initial partners to sign the partnership cer-
tificate. 97 Unlike the old Act, the 1976 ULPA does not generally require
limited partner signature on amendments98 and explicitly permits ap-
proval by an attorney-in-fact. 99
The 1976 ULPA retains the requirement that limited partners specifi-
cally approve the appointment of any new general partner'00 and the con-
tinuation of the partnership after general partner withdrawal.101 In addi-
tion, the new Act requires specific approval by any new limited partner of
the certificate amendment making him or her a partner 102 and by any lim-
ited partner for an amendment increasing the contribution of that part-
ner. 103 Despite these two new provisions, the limited partner's right to
approve amendments is reduced by the revised Act.
2. Access to Partnership Information
Though the 1976 ULPA requires little disclosure, it somewhat in-
creases limited partner access to partnership information. The Act speci-
fies that a general partner shall provide true and full information about
both the partnership business and the financial condition of the partner-
ship upon reasonable demand. 104 The old Act provided that limited part-
ners had the right to have the partnership books kept in the partnership's
place of business and to inspect and copy them. 105 The 1976 ULPA pro-
vides that a full list of all partners, a current certificate as amended, the
current written partnership agreement, all tax returns and reports, and any
partnership financial statements shall be so available. 106 Furthermore,
amendments to the partnership certificate shall be promptly mailed or de-
livered to the limited partners. ' 07 This ensures notice of certain changes in
the partnership structure.
3. Access to the Courts
The 1976 ULPA continues to provide limited partners with the same
97. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 204(a)(1).
98. Id. at § 204(a)(2).
99. Id. at § 204(b).
100. Id. at § 401.
101. Id. at § 801(3).
102. Id. at § 204(a)(2).
103. Id.
104. Id. at § 305.
105. 1916 ULPA, supra note 2, at § l0(l)(a). See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
106. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 105.
107. Id. at § 209.
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right as general partners to seek an accounting or judicial dissolution. 08
However, the limited partner who fails to receive a rightful distribution
can no longer seek dissolution; instead, under the 1976 ULPA, he has the
same remedies as a creditor. 109 Aside from this modification which elimi-
nates an unduly harsh remedy, one which could be disastrous to the other
partners, the right to dissolution is probably slightly increased after sub-
stantial rewriting in the provisions governing dissolution. 110
The new Act, like the old, incorporates section 21 of the Uniform Part-
nership Act dealing with fiduciary duties of partners. ' I
A new power granted to limited partners under the 1976 Act is the right
to bring partner derivative suits on behalf of the partnership." l2 These
suits were not authorized by the old Act, though most courts when faced
with the question did allow limited partners to initiate such suits. 113 The
section permitting partner derivative suits contains few procedural re-
quirements. 1 14 As a result, the right to bring derivative actions is more
readily available under the 1976 ULPA than it is under most corporate
law provisions for shareholder derivative suits. 115 The provision permit-
ting partner derivative suits will protect limited partners when general
partners wrongfully fail to prosecute a partnership claim.
B. Limitations on Control
Recognizing the criticisms of section 7 of the 1916 ULPA, the Com-
missioners drafted a substantially expanded control provision in section
303 of the 1976 ULPA. Unfortunately, their efforts failed to solve many
of the problems created by the old section. The overall effect of the new
section, like the old, is to obstruct most limited partner participation in
limited partnerships. In fact, the new control section probably narrows
the control that a limited partner may exercise. While the new provisions
are generally clearer than the old, they do not clarify the liability of the
limited partner who seeks to resolve a partnership crisis or who exercises
control of a limited partnership through a corporate general partner.
108. Id. at § 802.
109. Id. at § 606.
110. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 567-69.
111. See 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 1005 ("In any case not provided for in this Act the
provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act govern.").
112. Id. at §§ 1001-1004. See generally Hecker, supra note 4.
113. See notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Hecker, supra note 4, at 361-74. The 1976 ULPA also permits a successful plaintiff to
recover expenses. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 1004.
115. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 providing inter alia for award of expenses.
including attorney fees, to successful defendants and providing for security for such awards.
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1. Section 303(b)-Defining Control
Section 303(b) modifies the control provisions of the new Act by creat-
ing a "safe harbor" of defined activities that will not be deemed control
in violation of section 303(a). Sections 303(b)(1), (2), and (3) permit ac-
tivities generally sanctioned by existing case law. Specifically a limited
partner may be an employee, contractor, or agent of the partnership;" 6
may advise and consult with the general partner; 117 and may act as
surety. 118 Section 303(b)(4) permits limited partners to approve or dis-
approve amendments to the partnership agreement.1 19
Section 393(b)(5) permits partnerships to grant limited partners the
right to vote on five matters basic to the structure of the limited partner-
ship. These are:
i. the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership;
ii. the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all or
substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership other than in the
ordinary course of its business;
iii. the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership other than in
the ordinary course of its business;
iv. a change in the nature of the business; or
v. the removal of a general partner.120
This section is similar to amendments of the 1916 ULPA presently effec-
tive in several states. 1 21
Since subsection 5 is only permissive, it is likely that many limited
partnership agreements will not give limited partners these voting pow-
ers. However, the section will have a substantial impact on those limited
partnerships which are required to register under securities rules and regu-
lations 22 since many of these regulations require that limited partners be
given certain of these voting rights. 123 Section 303(b)(5) will ensure that
limited partners may exercise these rights without the threat of general
liability.
Section 303(b) is effective in eliminating some of the uncertainty as to
the extent of permissible control. However, section 303(b) does not au-
116. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 303(b)(1).
117. Id. at § 303(b)(2).
118. Id. at § 303(b)(3).
119. Id. at § 303(b)(4). This power was implied in the 1916 ULPA since limited partner approval
of amendments was required by that act. See text accompanying notes 17 and 18 supra.
120. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 303(b)(5).
121. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 64-74 supra.
123. See note 73 supra.
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thorize any limited partner oversight of partnership affairs except the giv-
ing of advice. It does not go far enough to permit reasonable investor
control.
2. Section 303(a)-The New Control Provision
Section 303(a) restates the control test of section 7 to provide two
levels of liability for limited parthers who exercise control in excess of
that permitted under the Act. Under section 303(a), a limited partner be-
comes generally liable if his control is "substantially the same as the ex-
ercise of the powers of a general partner." 124 The limited partner who
exercises control less than that of a general partner can become liable
"only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership with
actual knowledge of his participation." 125
According to the Comments to the section, the provision for general
liability where a limited partner exercises control that is "substantially
the same as" that of a general partner is intended "to avoid permitting a
limited partner to exercise all of the powers of a general partner while
avoiding any direct dealings with third parties .... . .126 Arguably only a
limited partner who acts as a general partner in all but name should be-
come generally liable under this clause. For example, the limited partner
who actually participates in and controls day-to-day decisions and activi-
ties would become generally liable. 127 On the other hand, a limited part-
ner who exercises indirect control, for instance through selection of an
employee of the partnership who shared financial control with the general
partner, would not be exercising day-to-day management and should fall
outside the clause. 128 Such a narrow reading would provide reasonable
predictability for partners and for their counsel. 129
Limited partner liability to "persons who transact business with the
limited partnership with actual knowledge of his control" provides an ad-
ditional basis for limited partner liability. This clause is apparently in-
tended to protect creditors and other third parties. 130 However, by its
wording it sweeps very broadly and could lead to liability in- many situa-
tions where there has been no liability under section 7. For example, a
124. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 303(a).
125. Id.
126. Commissioners' Comments to section 303, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 141 (Supp. 1980).
127. This is in accord with court interpretation of section 7 of the 1916 ULPA. See text accompa-
nying notes 75-76 supra.
128. This, too, is in accord with results under section 7. See Plasteel Products Corp. v. Helman,
271 F.2d 354 (lst Cir. 1959).
129. The few cases where liability was imposed under section 7 involved control which meets
this test. See notes 87 and 95 and accompanying text supra.
130. See 32 Sw. L.J., supra note 75, at 1323.
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limited partner who participates in obtaining partnership credit could be
found to have exercised control beyond his rights as a limited partner. 131
Clearly the lender would actually know of this participation and a court
might find that the limited partner was liable to that lender even in the
absence of evidence of actual reliance. Similarly, the participation of lim-
ited partners in trying to salvage a struggling partnership might well lead
to general liability under this clause. 132 It appears that the "actual knowl-
edge" test will, like section 7, lead to uncertainty, a lack of predictability
in planning, and excessive limited partner passivity. 133
V. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE 1976 UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ACT
The 1976 ULPA should be amended to resolve the limited partnership
problems discussed. The 1976 ULPA, like the 1916 ULPA, encourages
the limited partner to seek judicial resolution of partnership problems.
Yet often the courts cannot provide the best remedies; 134 indeed, seeking
a judicial remedy will often exacerbate problems. Modifications of the
1976 ULPA should permit limited partners some opportunities for direct
resolution of partnership problems. Such a resolution will generally be
quicker, less expensive, and more direct than litigation; it avoids both the
harm to relationships that frequently results from recourse to the courts
and the continuing damage that results from delays.
A. Permitting Reasonable Participation-Limiting the
Control Provisions
The control section should be altered to allow reasonable limited part-
ner participation in the partnership. The reluctance to grant limited liabil-
ity and concern with protection of creditors justified section 7 in 1916.135
Today, however, both of these considerations have lost their weight. Ap-
parently, the Commissioners retained the control provisions as part of
their plan to "retain the special character of limited partnerships as com-
131. As the limited partner did in Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wn. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950). See
note 89 and accompanying text supra.
132. Again leading to possible liability where there was none under section 7. See notes 84-86
and accompanying text supra.
133. The same general conclusion was reached in Comment, Limited Partner Control and Lia-
bility Under the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 32 Sw. L.J. 1301 (1979).
134. Judicial remedies may be particularly inadequate in the tax shelter context because the
investor who obtains damages loses the tax shelter benefits that made the investment attractive. For a
discussion of this problem, see Comment, Real Estate Limited Partnerships and Allocational Effi-
ciency: The Incentive to Suefor Securities Fraud, 63 VA. L. REV. 669 (1977).
135. See notes 8-16 and accompanying text supra.
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pared with corporations." 136 However, this purpose, without more, does
not justify the cost in terms of investor protection. The actual differences
between limited partnerships and corporations have diminished signifi-
cantly. 137 There is a substantial overlap in -the organizational characteris-
tics of the two forms which fits with a general tendency to promote eco-
nomic growth through greater flexibility in business structures.
In retaining the control provision, the Commissioners probably sought
to ensure partnership tax treatment for limited partnerships organized un-
der the revised Act. Under the Treasury regulations which differentiate
between partnerships and associations taxable as corporations, 138 limited
partnerships formed under the 1916 ULPA always qualify as partner-
ships. The Commissioners sought to assure the same result under the
1976 ULPA. 139 Certainty regarding tax treatment is of such great impor-
tance that, at the recommendation of the Commissioner, 140 no legislature
adopted the 1976 ULPA until the Internal Revenue Service officially
stated that partnership tax treatment would be accorded limited partner-
ships organized under the new Act. 141
One basis for automatic tax categorization as a partnership is the deter-
mination that limited partnerships lack the corporate characteristic of lim-
ited liability. 142 Ordinarily, the general liability of the general partner es-
tablishes that the partnership does not have limited liability for tax
purposes. However, where the general partner has no assets and is a mere
dummy for the limited partners, there may be limited liability in fact. 143
The control provisions operate in this situation to make the limited part-
ners generally liable. If the control provision did not have this effect, then
the presence or absence of limited liability would be a factual determina-
tion-the result which the Commissioners sought to avoid. To avoid this
case-by-case determination, it is adequate to retain the provision impos-
ing liability where a limited partner exercises control "substantially the
same as" that of a general partner.
There is no adequate reason, however, for also retaining the second
test, the "actual knowledge" test. This test's apparent purpose is not tax
classification but creditor protection. Creditor interests are provided for
by the new requirement that limited partnerships shall have "limited part-
136. Commissioners' Comment to 1976 ULPA, 6 U.L.A. supra note 8, at 127 (Supp. 1980).
137. See Hrusoff & Cazares, supra note 15, at 100-01.
138. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
139. See Caveat, 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 148 (Supp. 1980).
140. Id.
141. See note 5 supra.
142. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), (d) (1960).
143. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1960).
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nership" in their name. 144 The lender, thus put on notice, can ascertain
who is personally liable and seek additional security or guarantees if nec-
essary.145 Other doctrines exist to protect the creditor who is misled. 146
And even if additional protection is needed, a far narrower provision
would provide it.
Alternatively a more narrowly drafted creditor-protection clause could
make limited partners liable only to those third parties who reasonably
believe the limited partner to be a general partner and rely on this belief in
dealings with the partnership. As drafted, the actual knowledge test can
heavily penalize limited partner participation even though that participa-
tion is to the partnership's advantage and is appropriate for protection of
the limited partner's investment. There is no reason for this harsh result if
the third party was not misled and did not in fact rely on the limited part-
ner's apparent liability.
B. Access to Partnership Information-A Duty to Disclose
A statutory duty to disclose information about the partnership upon in-
vestment, 147 annually, and when conflicts of interest or substantial un-
foreseen events or changes in partnership operations occur, would signifi-
cantly increase limited partner ability to exercise reasonable control of the
limited partner investment. A duty to disclose partnership information
may effectively curb some managerial abuse. 148 By ensuring early notice
of partnership difficulties, such a duty will increase the likelihood of sal-
vage of the partnership business. Where a general partner fails to disclose
information, this will serve as a red flag both to the limited partners (if
they learn about it) and, if there is litigation, to the courts.
At the least it is appropriate to require an annual report of the progress
of the partnership. 149 Additional disclosure should be required whenever
144. 1976 ULPA, supra note 3, at § 102(1).
145. This protection is believed to be adequate for corporate creditors.
146. Examples include the contract concepts of reliance and collateral estoppel.
147. Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure at the time investors are sought, even for unregistered offer-
ings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1980).
148. This is one of the rationales underlying the disclosure emphasis of federal securities regula-
tion. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw 35, 50-51 (1966).
149. Little and Drasner state:
Once the sale is over, the typical limited partner customarily does not enjoy the flow of informa-
tion and attention that generally has come to be accorded to the corporate investor. There is no
newspaper which reflects the day-to-day fluctuations in the value of his investment. Annual
reports and periodic reports, when they are furnished, tend to be sketchy and confined largely to
financial information. Relatively few general partners concern themselves, to any significant
extent, with follow-up literature and an informational flow to the limited partners. Moreover,
few partnerships furnish limited partners financial and other data covering the operations of the
general partner.
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substantial deviation from the partnership's initial plan occurs. Disclosure
of any proposed transaction that involves a general partner conflict of in-
terest should also be required.
Such provisions would have advantages: They clarify disclosure re-
quirements which are now somewhat uncertain; they enable limited part-
ners to keep apprised of the affairs of the partnership in a routine and
orderly manner; and they clarify for both the courts and the general part-
ner the extent of the general partner's duty.
Are these requirements so burdensome that they will discourage entre-
preneurs from using the limited partnership form of operation? While
these requirements will be somewhat burdensome, in the well-run part-
nership they will simply involve a duty to communicate to the limited
partners information which is available for managerial purposes already.
The requirements would discourage two types of partnership.
First, they would correctly discourage the sloppy and ill-controlled
partnership. It is one thing for an entrepreneur to be sloppy with his or her
own money. It is quite another for a general partner to be sloppy with
funds over which the limited partner-investors have little or no control,
and which they have placed irrevocably in the general partner's hands. 150
Second, they would discourage the partnership organized for general
partner advantage to such a degree that limited partners probably would
object if they knew. It is unlikely that such objections would occur when
general partner remuneration is essentially fair; however, when re-
muneration is fair, it should be possible for the general partner to demon-
strate that fact. Some particularly complicated partnerships might run into
problems in trying to disclose proposed arrangements. However, by and
Little & Drasner, supra note 46, at 90-91.
There appears to be a substantial need to require continuing disclosure. "The failure of many
privately placed tax shelter partnerships to provide their investors with [quarterly and annual] reports
has been considered by the NASD and blue sky authorities to be one of the areas for potential abuse in
these types of securities." Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 39, at 340-41. See note 65 supra (discuss-
ing disclosure requirements).
150. The transferability of limited partnership interests is usually restricted. Many partnership
agreements contain provisions requiring general partner approval of any transfer; these provisions are
intended to establish the characteristic of limited transferability for tax classifications. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960). Probably more important is the lack of a ready market. This results
from the tax consequences of transfer, THE DIcKEY REPORT, supra note 40, at 10-11, as well as from
the difficulties of valuation and the lack of trading, which affect any untraded business interest. Hru-
soff and Cazares, supra note 15, at 116-17.
Of course, when the right of removal of the general partner is granted to the limited partners, as it
can be under the 1976 ULPA and under some present limited partnership acts, see note 62 supra, the
limited partners do have the ultimate possibility of removal. However, in practice this will be difficult
to effect in most cases. See, e.g., Roulac, supra note 39. Normally a limited partner is tied in to a
partnership very much as a minority shareholder is tied in to a closely held corporation.
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large, provisions for disclosure will probably discourage those partner-
ships where arrangements are in fact unfair.
C. Limited Partner Power
Limited partners need the power to disapprove general patner actions
primarily in two situations. First, limited partners should be able to limit
or control extraordinary general partner actions not proposed at the time
of partnership formation. Second, limited partners should be able to exer-
cise authority to limit or control partnership transactions in which the gen-
eral partner has a conflict of interest.
In designing reforms that will provide these powers, a legislature faces
two constraints. First, reforms must avoid .all provisions that will bring
into question automatic classification of limited partnerships as partner-
ships for tax purposes. Second, reforms must be designed to avoid mak-
ing the limited partnership vehicle too clumsy or too unrewarding to be
attractive to potential promoter-general partners. While there are many
problems in designing an appropriate method for limited partner control
of self-dealing and of extraordinary events, the need for such control is
too great to ignore.
Three general approaches are available for protecting investors. The
first is a fiat prohibition of transactions involving general partner conflict
of interest. This was the early approach to conflicts of interest in corpora-
tions. 151 This is also the approach adopted by some of the security regula-
tions applicable to limited partnership ventures. 152 A second approach has
been to grant investors removal power. This is the basic approach of cor-
porate law provisions permitting investors to periodically vote for the
board of directors. Such power may be granted by agreement of the part-
ners under the 1976 ULPA. 153 It is also provided for in some securities
regulations applicable to limited partnerships. 154 The third approach is to
require specific limited partner approval of all transactions involving a
general partner conflict of interest.
Each of these approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. A flat
prohibition of transactions involving a conflict of interest is probably not
workable. 155 Removal powers, while giving substantial power, may be
excessive in situations where the partnership is otherwise healthy; and it
151. See Marsh, supra note 148, at 36-39.
152. See note 69 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 116-123 supra.
154. See note 73 supra.
155. If enforced, such a rule would eliminate tax shelter limited partnerships as they presently
exist. The rigidity of such a rule would be a strong disincentive to the use of the limited partnership
form of organization.
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will be ineffective where the partnership is failing. Implementing removal
power will be difficult both in terms of creating an appropriate opportu-
nity to exercise it and in terms of fairly compensating both outgoing and
incoming general partners. 156
Although approval powers can easily become unduly cumbersome,
they appear to offer the best solution. This approach parallels the require-
ment of some securities regulations and corporate law proposals requiring
approval of transactions involving a conflict of interest by disinterested
trustees1 57 or directors.158 Approval powers are accorded under the 1916
ULPA 159 and are consonant with the character of limited partnerships. An
approval provision should require unanimous approval; in the past, voting
provisions providing for less than unanimous limited partner action cre-
ated tax classification problems. 160 To avoid making the process impossi-
bly cumbersome, a revised provision could require limited partner ap-
proval of transactions involving general partner conflict of interest or
extraordinary partnership events combined with permission for larger
limited partnerships to substitute an equivalent voting provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the 1916 ULPA was drafted, the typical limited partnership has
changed from a small, consensual organization to a relatively large, im-
personal, and risky tax-oriented organization. This change has resulted in
substantial problems of partnership failure and general partner abuse. De-
spite these admitted problems, the 1976 ULPA makes few changes that
address them.
156. For a discussion of these problems, see Roulac, supra note 39.
157. This is now a proposed requirement for real estate investment trusts. MIDWEST SECURITIES
COMMISSIONERS' Ass'N, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS, (adopted July
16, 1970), reprinted in [ 198011 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 4801 B.
158. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 41 (a) (1953). Alternatively, the MBCA permits
shareholder approval, id. at § 41 (b), or any transaction "fair and reasonable to the corporation." Id.
at § 41(c).
159. See text accompanying notes 17-29 supra.
160. See Haims and Strock, supra note 36, at 496-97.
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Legislators should consider modifying the 1976 ULPA to deal with
these problems. Three areas of change are recommended. First, the con-
trol provision, which subjects a limited partner to loss of limited liability
for excessive exercises of control, should be greatly narrowed. Broader
liability should result only when a limited partner exercises "control sub-
stantially the same as" that of a general partner. Any additional provision
for limited partner liability should be premised on reasonable creditor
reliance. A modified act should also take a position on the liability of
limited partners controlling a corporate general partner.
Second, general partners should have a duty to provide information
about the partnership to the limited partners. A modified act should estab-
lish requirements for disclosure at the time of investment and annually
thereafter; it should also require that the general partner disclose both ex-
traordinary partnership events and transactions involving conflicts of in-
terest.
Last, limited partners should be given power to respond directly to
partnership crises and to control general partner self-dealing. This power
could take a number of forms. Probably the approach most consistent
with both the tax regulations and the special character of the limited part-
nership is to grant limited partners the power to approve extraordinary
partnership actions and transactions involving a general partner conflict of
interest.
These recommendations should prove tax neutral. They provide means
of resolving partnership problems without resort to the courts and in a
manner consistent with the basic nature of the limited partnership.
Mary E. Brumder
